Pricing multi-interval economic dispatch of electric power under operational uncertainty is considered in this twopart paper. Part I investigates dispatch-following incentives for generators under the locational marginal pricing (LMP) and temporal locational marginal pricing (TLMP) policies. Extending the theoretical results developed in Part I, Part II evaluates a broader set of performance measures under a general network model. For networks with power flow constraints, TLMP is shown to have an energy-congestion-ramping price decomposition that, with perfect demand forecast, results in a positive merchandising surplus equal to the sum of congestion rent and ramping costs. The revenue of the operator under LMP and other uniform pricing schemes cannot cover both congestion rent and the loss-of-opportunity payments to generators. It is also shown that TLMP imposes a penalty on generators with insufficient ramping capabilities, thus providing incentives for generators to reveal the ramping limits truthfully and improve its ramping capabilities. Such incentives, however, are lacking for existing uniform pricing schemes. Several benchmark pricing mechanisms are evaluated under the rolling-window dispatch and pricing models. Among the performance measures considered are the level of out-of-the-market uplifts, the revenue adequacy of the system operator, consumer payment, generator profit, and price volatility.
I. INTRODUCTION
This two-part paper addresses some of the open problems in pricing multi-interval dispatch subject to ramping constraints and forecasting uncertainty. Part I focuses on theoretical issues surrounding dispatch-following incentives with two major conclusions. One is that, under the rollingwindow dispatch model, uniform-pricing schemes cannot provide dispatch-following incentives that avoid out-of-themarket uplifts. Because such uplifts are discriminative, an equivalence of price-discrimination is necessary.
Another conclusion is that the temporal locational marginal pricing (TLMP) provides full dispatch-following incentives that eliminate the need for any out-the-market settlement under the rolling-window economic dispatch model and arbitrary demand forecast accuracy.
Providing dispatch-following incentive is only one of the many measures that pricing mechanisms need to be evaluated for adoption. Part II presents a study on a broader range of issues relating to pricing multi-interval dispatch when demand forecasts may not be accurate.
We focus on two categories of performance measures. The first is on two types of incentive compatibilities specific to multi-interval dispatch. One is the degree for which a particular pricing mechanism provides the necessary dispatchfollowing incentives for generators. Here we measure the lack of dispatch incentives by the size of the (ex-post) lost-ofopportunity (LOC) payment. The higher the LOC payment, the greater the incentive to deviate the dispatch signal. The other is whether it is to the generator's benefit to reveal its ramping limits truthfully. If a generator receives higher profit under a pricing mechanism by under-reporting ramping capability, then the pricing mechanism not only distorts the actual ramping ability of the system but also discourages a generator from improving its ramping capacity.
The second category of performance measures is on the revenue adequacy and social welfare distribution. We are particularly interested in whether a pricing mechanism ensures the revenue adequacy of the operator. For multi-interval dispatch over a network with flow constraints, the revenue of the operator needs to cover the generation cost, the cost of ramping-induced out-of-the-market uplifts, and the cost of congestion rent. When the operator is regulated to be revenue-neutral, its surplus or shortfall is socialized among consumers. Thus the revenue adequacy of the operator affects costs to consumers. Different pricing mechanisms result in different allocations of social welfare. A pricing scheme that yields higher generator profits may, at the same time, be more costly to consumers. In general, no pricing mechanism dominates all others across a wide range of performance measures. A regulator of public utility typically favors a pricing policy that guarantees revenue adequacy of the generators while minimizing the cost to consumers.
Transparency and volatility are also relevant metrics for evaluating pricing mechanisms. Uniform pricing schemes are transparent and effective pricing signals for market participants. The use of out-of-the-market uplifts, however, affects the transparency of uniform pricing. Nonuniform pricing, in general, lacks transparency.
A. Summary of results and related work
The main contribution of Part II is twofold. First, we extend key theoretical results in Part I to a network setting in Proposition 1-5. Whereas most theoretical results such as the strong equilibrium property of TLMP generalize naturally to systems with network constraints, we obtain new results that demonstrate more succinctly the spatial-temporal decomposition of TLMP.
Proposition 2 gives an explicit decomposition of TLMP into energy, congestion, and ramping prices, which shows that TLMP is the sum of a public price in the form of LMP and a private ramping price; the former is transparent to all participants, and the latter plays the role of in-the-market discrimination.
We show in Proposition 3 that, under the one-shot economic dispatch and assuming perfect demand forecasting, the merchandising surplus of TLMP is positive and is equal to the sum of congestion rent and generators' ramping costs. In contrast, Proposition 1 shows the merchandising surplus of LMP covers only the congestion rent but not the necessary out-of-the-market uplifts.
Proposition 3 also shows that payments to a generator under LMP is higher than that to TLMP, implying that TLMP imposes a penalty on generators for their inabilities to ramp sufficiently. From the individual generator's perspective, Proposition 4 shows that, under TLMP, a generator with higher ramping limits receives higher payments than an identical generator with limited ramping capability. This result implies that TLMP discourages under-reporting ramping limits and encourages generators to improve ramping capability.
The second part of our contribution is the empirical simulation studies on incentives, the revenue adequacy of the ISO, consumer payments, and generator profits. We are interested in particular in the effects of forecasting error and congestions on these performance measures. We compared several benchmark pricing schemes in the literature under the rolling-window dispatch model: the classical multi-interval LMP, TLMP, price preserving multi-interval pricing (PMP) [1] , [2] , constraints-preserving multi-interval pricing (CMP) [2] , and multi-settlement LMP (MLMP).
There is a fairly extensive literature on pricing multi-period dispatch. See a summary of related work in Part I [3] and references therein. The impact of multi-interval dispatch on LMP was considered in [4] . The work most relevant to this paper is the recent work of Hua et al. [2] and Zhao, Zheng, and Litvinov [5] that articulate some of the critical issues and set forth formal statements of investigation.
Proofs, some detailed derivations, and simulations involving network constraints can be found in Appendix.
II. SYSTEM AND OPERATION MODELS A. Generation, demand, and network models
We consider a power system with M buses under the direct-current (DC) power flow model with line-flow con-straints. We follow the same notations used in Part I, adding bus indices as superscripts to relevant variables.
Without loss of generality, we assume that every bus has N generators * . Let g m it be the dispatch of generator i at bus m in interval t, g g g m [t] = (g m 1t , · · · , g m N t ) the dispatch vector at bus m, and g g g[t] = (g g g 1 [t], · · · , g g g M [t]) the dispatch vector in interval t from all generators.
We assume that there is one aggregated inelastic demand at each bus. For the demand at bus m, let d m t be the actual demand in interval t,d m t the forecasted demand,
The spatial property of the power flow is governed by the DC power flow model where the branch power flow vector is a linear function of the net power injection
is the vector of bus generations, and q m t = i g m it the total generation from bus m in t. For a network with total B branches, the 2B-dimensional vector z z z[t] of branch power flows † satisfies
where S S S is the 2B × M shift-factor matrix ‡ .
B. The rolling-window dispatch model
The rolling-window economic dispatch (R-ED) policy G R-ED is defined by a sequence of W -interval look-ahead economic dispatch policies (G R-ED t , t = 1, · · · , T ). At time t, G R-ED t solves the following W -interval economic dispatch optimization using as its inputs (i) the realized dispatch g g g R-ED [t − 1] in interval t − 1 and (ii) the load forecast 
subject to: Network constraints:
* One use non-generating generators to make up total N generators by setting the generation capacites to zero of such generators. † Each branch has two directional power flows. ‡ Matrix S S S can be made time varying without affecting the results.
where G G G = [g g g[t], · · · , g g g[t + W − 1]] is the matrix of all generation variables in the W -interval look-ahead window, and F t (G G G) is the total generation cost
Here f m it ′ (·) is the generation cost of generator i at bus m in interval t, assumed to be convex and differentiable. Vector c c c ≥ 0 is the vector of line-flow constraints.
Dual variables in (1) play a prominent role in multi-interval pricing, where λ t ′ is the dual variable associated with the power balance equation in interval t ′ , φ φ φ[t ′ ] the dual variables associated with line constraints, and (µ m it ′ ,μ m it ′ , ρ m it ′ ,ρ m it ′ ) the dual variables for the lower and upper limits for ramping and generation, respectively.
We assume that the primal and dual solutions of (1) are unique. Let (g m * it ′ ) be the solution of the above optimization, and µ m * i(t−1) ,μ m * i(t−1) the optimal dual variables. Under R-ED policy G R-ED t , the dispatch in the binding interval t is set at g R-ED mit := g m * it .
Also relevant are the (shadow) ramping prices (µ m * i(t−1) ,μ m * i(t−1) ) that capture the interdependencies of decisions across sliding windows. For later references, define the boundary ramping prices as
A particular case of R-ED is the one-shot economic dispatch G 1-ED that applies R-ED at t = 1 with window size W = T equal to the total scheduling period.
III. ROLLING-WINDOW LMP AND TLMP
A rolling-window pricing policy P = (P 1 , · · · , P T ) follows the same structure as the rolling-window economic dispatch. At time t, P t sets prices at all M buses for the binding interval t. It may also provide advisory prices for the future intervals within the pricing window H t = {t, · · · , t+W −1}.
Here we summarize the standard rolling-window LMP (R-LMP) policy P R-LMP t and the rolling-window TLMP P R-TLMP t derived in Part I for systems with power flow constraints. Both R-LMP and R-TLMP are marginal cost pricing mechanisms derived from the R-ED optimization (1); they are by-products of the R-ED policy.
A. Rolling-window LMP (R-LMP) and Properties
Let the realized price vector in the binding interval t set by R-LMP be π R-LMP [t] = (π R-LMP 1t , · · · , π R-LMP Mt ) where π R-LMP mt is the uniform price for all generators and demand at bus m.
The R-LMP π R-LMP mt is defined by the marginal cost of meeting demand d m t at bus m in interval t. From (1) and by the envelope theorem, we have
where 1 is a vector of 1's, λ R-LMP t and φ φ φ R-LMP [t] the shadow prices § from (1) for the power balance and congestion constraints in interval t, respectively.
We summarize next main properties of R-LMP. Even though R-LMP is computed based on current and future demand forecasts subject to ramping constraints, properties of the single-period LMP hold for the multi-interval R-LMP.
1) Energy-congestion price decomposition: The R-LMP expression (4) shows an explicit energy-congestion price decomposition, where the first term λ R-LMP t is the system-wide uniform-price of energy for all generators and demands. The
is the congestion-induced differentiation of prices at different locations. Note that there are no ramping prices explicitly shown in R-LMP; the R-LMP expression is identical to that in the standard single-interval LMP. The inter-temporal effects of ramping on R-LMP are hidden in the sequence of R-LMP prices π R-LMP [t].
2) Equilibrium properties: We have shown in Part I that, for the single-bus network and under the perfect load forecast assumption, the one-shot economic dispatch G G G ED and LMP π LMP form a general equilibrium. This property holds for systems with network constraints. Unfortunately, the rollingwindow version of economic dispatch and LMP (g g g R-ED , π R-LMP ) do not satisfy the general equilibrium condition in general, even when the load forecasts are accurate; out-of-the-market uplifts are necessary.
3) ISO's revenue adequacy: The classical LMP theory for the single-interval LMP policy [6] states that the ISO has a non-negative merchandising surplus that covers the system congestion rent. This result extends to R-LMP under arbitrary forecast errors when there are ramping constraints.
Proposition 1 (ISO revenue adequacy under R-LMP). For all
(g g g R-ED [t], π R-LMP [t
]) generated by the R-ED and R-LMP policies under arbitrary forecasting errors, the ISO has non-negative merchandising surplus
Proposition 1 shows that the merchandising surplus from R-LMP covers and only covers the congestion rent designated to pay transmission-line owners and financial transmission right (FTR) holders. There is no extra surplus within the market settlement to cover the out-of-the-market uplifts designed to ensure dispatch-following incentives. Thus the ISO is likely to be revenue inadequate under R-LMP when the ISO has to pay out-of-the-market uplifts.
B. Rolling-window TLMP (R-TLMP) and Properties
As a generalization of R-LMP to a nonuniform marginalcost pricing, R-TLMP allows individualized prices for gen- § When defining prices with Lagrange multipliers, we implicitly assume that the solutions to the dual optimization are unique. erators and demands. Specifically, the R-TLMP at bus m in interval t is a set of prices
m0t is the price for the demand and π R-TLMP mit the price for generator i at bus m.
For the demand at bus m in interval t, its R-TLMP π R-TLMP m0t is defined as the marginal cost to the system to satisfy the demand d m t -the same definition used in LMP:
The R-TLMP for generator i at bus m, on the other hand, is defined by the marginal benefit of generator producing power g m * it . In other words, generator i is treated as an inelastic negative-demand set at the R-ED solution to (1), i.e., g m it = g m * it . As defined in Part I,
is the total generation cost excluding that from generator i at bus m in interval t. When the partial derivative above does not exist, a subgradient is used.
The following proposition generalizes the TLMP expression in Part I.
be the optimal values of the dual variables associated with the constraints in (1) .
The R-TLMP for the demandd m t at bus m in interval t is given by
where where s s s m is the m-th column of the shift-factor matrix S S S corresponding to bus m. The R-TLMP for the rolling-window dispatch from generator i at bus m in interval t is given by
where
Properties of R-TLMP for power systems with network constraints are summarized next.
1) Energy-congestion-ramping decomposition: The specific form of R-TLMP in (6) reveals an explicit spacetime decomposition of payment to generators: a system-wide uniform energy price in λ * t applies to all generators and demands everywhere, a spatial discriminative price in the form of location-specific congestion prices in s s s ⊺ m φ φ φ * [t] applying to all generators and demands at bus m, and a generatorspecific temporal ramping prices in ∆ m * it that serves as a "penalty" to the generator for its limited ramping capability. The penalty interpretation of ∆ m * it is especially important for the incentives of the truthful revelation of ramping limits, as discussed next.
2) Public-private price decomposition and transparency:
The structure of R-TLMP shown in (7) shows a public and private price decomposition: the R-LMP part of R-TLMP captures the standard uniform pricing for the energy and congestion costs that are transparent to all market participants. By revealing the R-LMP part of the TLMP, the system operator can provide the necessary system-wide pricing signal effectively for market participants.
On the other hand, the ramping part of R-TLMP ∆ m * it is private; it is related to the ramping conditions of individual generators. It is neither necessary nor practical to make this part of the price transparent. Thus R-TLMP can be viewed as a semi-transparent pricing mechanism, which makes it no less transparent than uniform pricing schemes with out-ofthe-market uplifts.
3) ISO's revenue adequacy: The space-time decomposition of R-TLMP provides insights into sources of ISO's surplus. To this end, we consider the ideal case of one-shot TLMP with a perfect load forecast.
Proposition 3 (ISO revenue adequacy under TLMP). Consider the one-shot economic dispatch
The total ISO merchandising surplus decomposes into ramping and congestion surpluses:
The above proposition does not generalize to the rollingwindow TLMP policy, unfortunately. There are indeed cases when TLMP does not guarantee revenue adequacy (after ramping surplus is removed). Nonetheless, simulations show that the shortfall due to TLMP is quite small compared with all other alternatives. 4) Ramping price as a penalty for inadequate ramping: Note that the TLMP and LMP have the same demand price (thus the same revenue) and the same congestion revenue. From (8) and the fact that MS LMP = MS con , the total generator payment under TLMP must be less than that under LMP. The following proposition suggests that the ramping price ∆ m * it of TLMP plays the role of penalty for inadequate ramping.
Proposition 4 (Revenue gap under LMP and TLMP). Consider the one-shot economic dispatch G 1-ED defined in (1) , and let (g m * it , µ m * it ,μ m * it ) be the solution of the primal and dual variables associated with generator i at bus m and interval t. If ¶ µ m * i0 = µ m * iT = 0, then the difference between the payment ¶ The assumption µ m * i0 = µ m * iT = 0 has minimum impact for large T and becomes innocuous if the initial and final ramping constraints can be relaxed.
for delivering (g m * it , t = 1, · · · , T ) under LMP and TLMP is nonnegative and
For interpretation, consider two generators at the same bus with the same generation level. One generator has high ramping limits so that there are no binding ramping constraints; the other has binding ramping constraints. Under LMP, the two generators receive the same payment. Proposition 4 shows that, under TLMP, however, the one with high ramping limits receives a higher payment than the one having binding ramping constraints. This suggests that it is to the generator's benefit not to under-report its ramping limit, and the generator is incentivized to improve its ramping capability. This insight is validated in simulations in Sec V.
5) Equilibrium properties:
The strong equilibrium property of R-TLMP shown in Part I holds when network constraints are imposed. Under TLMP, there is no incentive for any generator to deviate from the dispatch signal regardless of the accuracy of demand forecast and no need for out-ofthe-market uplifts.
Proposition 5 (Strong equilibrium property of TLMP). Given arbitrary load forecast, the rolling-window dispatch (g R-ED mit ) and rolling-window TLMP (π R-TLMP mit ) form a strong equilibrium, resulting zero LOC uplifts.
IV. RELATED BENCHMARK PRICING POLICIES
We present here several benchmark pricing policies that also use the same rolling-window dispatch model. Missing in the discussion is the flexible ramping product (FRP) that has been implemented in CAISO because FRP uses a different optimization procedure that produces different dispatch signals. The development here follows [2] , [5] , [7] .
A. Price-Preserving Multi-interval Pricing (PMP)
Unlike LMP and TLMP that derive prices from R-ED, PMP [1] , [2] employs a separate pricing optimization aimed at minimizing the uplift payment.
The rolling-window PMP policy G R-PMP t at time t sets uniform prices π R-PMP [t] in the binding interval t using (i) the past rolling-window PMP prices || (π R-PMP [t−1], · · · , π R-PMP [1] ) and (ii) the demand forecasts
At time t, let G G G = g g g [1] , · · · , g g g[t + W − 1] be all the generation variables involved in the past, current, and look-|| In practical implementation, one may include only a few past decision intervals. ahead intervals. The rolling-window PMP policy G R-PMP t solves the following optimization:
where G R-PMP represents the set of individual generation constraints such as ramp and generation limits. See Appendix F.
The rolling-window PMP sets the price for generation in interval t by
where λ R-PMP t and φ φ φ R-PMP [t] are the multipliers associated with power balance and line-flow constraints in (11).
Note that the objective function can be written as
where the first term is the generation cost in the look-ahead window. Ignoring the first term, the second term (without the negative sign) represent the estimate of the total surplus (including the LOC uplifts) up to time t − 1.
B. Constraint-Preserving Multi-interval Pricing (CMP)
CMP [2] is another policy that generates uniform prices in a separate optimization different from the rolling-window economic dispatch. Instead of involving past settled prices in PMP, CMP enforces the ramping constraints between the rolling-window economic dispatch and the dispatch variables used in the pricing models.
The rolling-window CMP policy G R-CMP t at time t sets prices π R-CMP [t] in the binding interval t using (i) the past rollingwindow economic dispatch g g g R-ED [t − 1], (ii) shadow prices from (1) (µ R-ED mit ,μ R-ED mit ) that tie generation between intervals t − 1 and t, and (iii) load forecasts
, · · · , g g g[t + W − 1] be the generation variables within the W -interval lookahead window, and F t (G G G) the total cost of generation. The rolling-window CMP policy G R-CMP t solves the following optimization:
where G R-CMP represents the set of individual generation constraints. See Appendix F.
be the dual variable solution to the above optimization associated with the power balance equation and line flow constraints, respectively. The rollingwindow CMP set the price at bus m and interval t by
(14)
C. Multi-settlement LMP (MLMP)
The multi-settlement LMP extends the day-ahead and realtime pricing mechanisms to the rolling-window dispatch setting. We use Fig. 1 to illustrate the settlement process for generation and demand in interval t * .
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Settlement 1
Ht * −2 When W -interval rolling-window dispatch is used to generate dispatch, there are W sequential "markets", one for each sliding window covered intervals, as shown in Fig. 1 . The first sliding window that includes interval t * is H t * −W +1 = {t * − W + 1, · · · , t * }. At t = t * − W + 1, the W -interval economic dispatch (1) is used to generate the advisory dispatchĝ m,1 it * for the generator i at bus m in interval t * . The superscript "1" indicates that this is the first time dispatch in interval t * is settled. Also generated from (1) is the advisory LMPπ m,1 t * for all generators. The market settles at time t * by payingπ m,1 t * ×ĝ m,1 it * to generator i at bus m to deliverĝ m,1 it * in interval t * . As the window slides one interval at a time toward t * , the process generates a sequence of W dispatches and LMPs (π m,1 t * ,ĝ m,1 it * , · · · ,π m,W t * ,ĝ m,W it * ) for generator i at bus m in interval t * . Note thatπ m,W t * = π R-LMP m,t andĝ m,W it * = g R-ED mit * . With the advisory dispatchĝ m,k it * in the k-th market for generator i at bus m, the generator is paidπ m,k t * ×(ĝ m,k it * −ĝ m,k−1 it * ) for the deviation from the previously settled dispatch. The total revenue R M-LMP mit * under the multi-settlement LMP for delivering power g R-ED mit * is given by
Settlement 2
Note that, while R M-LMP mit * is a linear function with respect to (ĝ m,1 it * , · · · ,ĝ m,W it * ), it is not linear with respect to the power delivered g R-ED mit * in interval t * .
V. PERFORMANCE
We present comparison studies among the LMP-based pricing (LMP and TLMP) and several benchmark pricing schemes (PMP, CMP, and MLMP) described in Sec. IV. Our goal is to gain insights into essential tradeoffs among dispatch incentives, incentives for the truthful revelation of ramping limits, ISO revenue adequacy, consumer payments, generator profits, and price volatility.
A. Simulation settings
As concept demonstrations, we chose two small simulation settings, one involving three generators at a single bus, the other involving a three-zone network with power flow constraints abstracted from the ISO-NE network settings. Such small setups, while not realistic in practice, are sufficiently complex to reveal non-trivial characteristics of multi-interval dispatch and pricing. Simulation results for the three-zone network cases are presented in the Appendix H. We modeled demand as a Gaussian distributed random vector over a 24 hour time scheduling period with the average demand from an CAISO load profile and a standard deviation of 4%. Fig 2 shows the average demand and demand traces.
We used a standard forecasting error model ** where the demand forecastd (t+k)|t of d t+k at time t has error variance kσ 2 increasing linearly k. In simulations σ is set as percentage of the mean value.
For the single-bus simulation, generator parameters are shown in Fig. 3 . The performance is evaluated with varying ramping limits with generator G1 having the ramping limit of 25 MW/h. The ramp limits of generators G2 and G3 vary along the path from scenario A to H with A having the most stringent ramping constraints and H the most relaxed.
B. Dispatch-following and ramping-revelation incentives 1) LOC and dispatch-following incentives:
We first con- the greater the LOC payment, the higher the incentive to deviate the dispatch signal (in the absence of LOC payment). The computation of LOC for the pricing models considered in this paper is shown in Appendix G. Right panel: LOC for ramping scenario A under forecast error variance σ = 0%, 0.1%, 0.6%, 6%. Fig. 4 shows the total LOC payment from the ISO to generators at different ramping rates along the ramping trajectory in Fig. 3 . Notice the general trend that all schemes converged to zero as scenarios of binding ramping constraints diminished at scenario H.
As predicted by the equilibrium property, LOC for TLMP was strictly zero, and all other pricing schemes had positive LOC payments. PMP designed to minimize LOC appeared to have the least LOC among the rest of the uniform pricing schemes. Shown also in Fig. 4 is that LOC increased with the forecasting error variance, as expected.
2) Truthful revelation of ramping limits: This simulation aimed at illustrating incentives of the truthful revelation of ramping limits under various pricing schemes. We varied the revealed ramping limit of one generator and kept the others fixed at the true ramp limits. Fig. 5 : Generator profit vs. revealed ramp limit at σ = 6% for ramp scenario H. Left: ramp limits of G2 and G3 are fixed at 60 MW/h. Middle: ramp limit of G1 is fixed at 25 MW/h and G3 at 60 MW/h. Right: ramp limits of G1 is fixed 25 and G2 at 60 MW/h. Fig. 5 shows the generator profit as a function of its revealed ramping limits for the ramping scenario H with true ramp limits as 25 MW/h for G1, 60 MW/h for G2 and G3. Under TLMP, profits of all generators grew as the revealed ramping limits grew to their true values. The implication was that the generators had incentives to reveal their ramp limits truthfully and to improve their ramping capabilities. For the rest of uniform pricing schemes, the profits of generators G2 and G3 increased as the revealed ramp limits deviate from their true values, implying that generators had incentives to under-report their ramp limits. Fig. 6 shows the ISO surplus that included the LOC payments. The results validated the fact that uniform pricing schemes, in general, have positive LOC, resulting in a deficit for the ISO. For TLMP, the ramping charge on generators led to a positive merchandising surplus, as shown in Proposition 3. The simulations involving a network shown in Appendix H also showed that the rolling-window TLMP had a merchandising surplus from both ramping and congestion. Coupled with the fact TLMP always had zero LOC, TLMP showed a positive merchandising surplus. The ISO surpluses for all pricing schemes converged to the congestion rent (which was zero in the single-node case) as ramping events diminished with increasing ramping limits. For TLMP, the ISO surplus decreased from the positive because ISO collected less penalty charges to generators. The ISO surpluses for all other pricing schemes increased from the negative because of the decreasing LOC payments.
C. Revenue adequacy of ISO
D. Consumer payments and generator profits
We assumed that ISO was financially neutral; when the ISO had a positive surplus (after excluding the congestion surplus), the consumers received a price reduction as a rebate. When the ISO had a deficit, the consumers paid additional to cover the deficit. Fig. 7 shows the consumer payments under the assumption that the demand is credited (or charged) for any ISO surplus (or deficit). TLMP was the least expensive for the consumer and PMP the least expensive among uniform pricing schemes. The decreasing trend of consumer payments with less ramping constraints under uniform pricing schemes was due to the decreasing costs of LOC payments to the generators. The increasing trend of consumer payment under TLMP was due to the less surplus of ISO passed to the consumers for collecting penalties from generators. Again, the consumer payments increased with the forecasting error.
The total generator profit figures have identical trends as those of consumer payments because the operator has zero surplus. TLMP had the least generator profits, and PMP had the least generator profits among uniformly priced schemes. Note that the forecasting errors resulted in higher generator profits for LMP, CMP, and MLMP because of high LOC payments to generators. 
E. Price volatility
The volatility of a random price in an hour can be measured by the standard deviation of the price normalized by the average of the price in the hour. A highly volatile price makes LMP forecasting difficult. Fig. 8 includes a table of price volatility averaged over all hours. Among the compared pricing mechanisms, TLMP † † † † The normalized standard deviation of TLMP is averaged over for all the demand and generators. showed consistently lower volatility. We also noticed that price volatility increased with stricter ramping limits and increasing demand forecasting errors.
VI. CONCLUSION
This two-part paper considers pricing of multi-interval dispatch under demand forecast uncertainty. We establish that, in order to provide dispatch-following incentives, discrimination either in the form uniform pricing with out-of-the-market uplifts or non-uniform pricing becomes necessary. In particular, we show that, as a generalization of LMP, the non-uniform TLMP eliminates the need of the out-of-the-market uplifts. We also consider incentives of truthful revelation of ramping limits. We show that, by penalizing the ramping limits, TLMP provides incentives for generators to improve its ramping capability and reveal the true ramping limits. Unfortunately, such incentives are lacking in the existing pricing schemes.
Under the rolling-window dispatch, different pricing schemes differ in the distribution of the overall socialwelfare among generators and consumers. Among the pricing mechanisms considered in this paper, TLMP leads to the least consumer payment but also the lowest generator profit. Likewise, among uniform pricing schemes, PMP leads to the least consumer payment and the lowest generator profits.
Using (19) (20) , the computation of LOC under the rollingwindow version of LMP, TLMP, PMP,and CMP are made by substituting g g g by the rolling-window dispatch g g g R-ED and π by the rolling-window of the corresponding prices.
2) Multi-settlement prices: For the multi-settlement pricing such as MLMP, note that the generator can only affect the revenue by setting the dispatch in the binding interval. Therefore, in calculating LOC M-LMP , the only decision variables are the realized generations.
Letg t be the pre-binding dispatch of interval t, i.e., ,g t is the advisory dispatch levelĝ m,W −1 it for generator i at bus m in the (W −1)th settlement as shown in Fig. 1 . The generator profit maximization problem is given by
Sinceg t is given, the above optimization has the same solution as p p p * as that of (20) for R-LMP using π R-LMP (although the values of the two optimization are different).
The LOC for MLMP is therefore average load demand and ramping scenarios (The ramping limit for G1 is fixed at 300MW/h).
H. Simulation results for a system with network constraints
We considered a three-generator two-transmission line network abstracted from the 8-zone ISO New England (ISO-NE) case shown in Fig. 9 . Base on an ISONE load data profile, 100 load scenarios were generated as in the single bus case. The standard deviation of the one-step forecasting error was set at σ = 0.6%. Other settings in these simulations are similar to the one-node case unless otherwise specified.
Pricing performance was evaluated with varying congestion and ramping limits. Line capacity of Line 1 (L1) varied from 1000MW to no congestion, and Line 2 (L2) was always congestion-free. The ramp limits of generations G2 and G3 varied along the path from scenario A to E with A having the most stringent ramping constraints and E the most relaxed.
Conclusions drawn for the single-node cases held mostly in simulations involving a network with power flow constraints. We provide here additional comments, especially related to congestions. 1) Dispatch-following and ramping-revelation incentives: Fig. 10 shows measures of incentives. The top left panel of Fig. A2 shows the total LOC payment at different ramping rates along the ramping trajectory in Fig. 10 . As shown in Proposition 5, the strong equilibrium property of TLMP dictated that its LOC strictly zero. All other pricing schemes had LOC with PMP having the least amount. The LOC converged when ramping constraints vanished at scenario E.
In evaluating incentives for generators to reveal its ramping limits truthfully, we fixed all but one generator at their true ramp limits and varied the revealed ramping limits of a single generator. The three figures in Fig. 10 show that only TLMP received the highest profit when the revealed ramp limit matched with the actual value. There are incentives for G2 and G3 to under-report ramping limits for all other pricing schemes.
2) Revenue adequacy of ISO : The revenue adequacy ISO when the network is in congestion needs to take into account congestion rent. The total ISO surplus is thus given by ISO surplus = Payment from demand − Congestion rent −Payment to generators (inc LOC). Fig. 11 shows the surplus of ISO without excluding (left) congestion rent and after excluding (right) congestion rent. Before the congestion rent was excluded, all pricing mechanisms showed a positive surplus for ISO, indicating that demand payments include substantial congestion-related payments. Note also that all pricing schemes converged to the congestion rent as ramping limits diminished under scenario E.
After congestion rent was removed, uniform pricing schemes had a noticeable negative ISO surplus. Under TLMP, ISO remained to be revenue adequate for all cases except under scenario C where there was a small deficit. Note that this is not in contradiction to Proposition 3 where the singleshot dispatch and perfect forecasting are assumed.
3) Consumer payments and generator profits: Fig 12  shows the consumer payments (left) and generator profits (right) under the assumption that the operator charges its shortfall (and returns its profit) to consumers. Note that consumer payments and generator profits were strongly dependent; the lower the consumer payment was, the lower generator payments were. Consumer payments under TLMP were shown to be the lowest. Unlike the single-node case, LMP had the least consumer payment among uniform pricing schemes. Note also that, except for LMP, all uniform pricing schemes resulted in decreasing consumer payments when ramping constraints were relaxed from A to E. The consumer payment for TLMP increased along the same path of ramping scenarios. These trends were consistent with the single-node case. The trend for LMP, however, did not follow that in the single-node case due to a complicated interaction of congestion and ramping constraints.
4) Price volatility: The price volatility was evaluated under both ramping and congestion constraints. Fig. 13 shows that the average price standard deviation table under strict (A), relaxed (E), and unconstrained (H) ramping limit scenarios. The price standard deviation in the table was averaged over the 24-hour period whereas the two figures below are the hourly average price standard deviation.
The same conclusions as in the single node case held. For the most part, TLMP appeared to be the least volatile among pricing schemes evaluated in this paper. 
